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TAL	KING POINTS FOR DDCI ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR	8 June 1983	1
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The war has settled	l into skirmishing aned	oorder smelling.	
ny new Iranian attacks	over next two months are	e likely to be	
imited in scale and obj	ectives. Meanwhile, ec	onomic pressures	
on Iraq mount, while Ira	in's economic situation	is improving as a	
esult of increased oil	sales.		
Current Military Situati	.on	:	25 X 1
Iran's primary t	croop concentration stil	l is on the	
Doveyrij River f	ront west of Dezful, bu	t in the past	
three weeks it h	as begun moving two int	antry brijadės	
from the area.			
The Iranians app	parently have decided to	prepare another	
attack. Its tim	ing and location are no	t yet clear, and	
its scope would	be limited.		25 X 1
Recovery of N	laft-e Shah, the only Ira	anian town still.	
held by the I	raqis, is a possible you	al.	
he Military Balance	- ,	•	
The Iraqis hold	numerical advantages of	more than two to	
one in every cat	egory of conventional m	ilitary equipment	25X1
at most location	is along the front.		20/(1
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- -- They hold air superiority of nearly four to one and have assured sources of resupply from abroad. The

 Iraqis also have the ability quickly to detect Iranian buildups and rapidly to reinforce.
- -- The most severe limiting factor on Iran's military capability is the lack of a reliable supplier of major weapons systems.
 - -- Losses in the war and the Western arms embargo have rendered some two-thirds of Iran's military equipment inoperative or partially operative.
 - -- The Iranians have slightly more troops in the field, but many of them are ill-equipped and poorly trained and lack discipline.
 - -- Logistics factors have lengthened the time required to build up for attacks and shortened the duration of recent offensives.

The Longer Term

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Iranian strategy has probably shifted toward fighting a low-intensity war of attrition punctuated by occasional multi-brigade attacks, none of which could achieve militarily the often stated goal of bringing down the regime of Saddam Hussein.

- -- Tehran's several military failures in the past year have incurred heavy casualties, increasing war weariness in the population.
- -- Debate over the war continues in Tehran, but Ayatollah
 Khomeini shows no signs of backing away from an agressive
 military strategy. As long as he lives, a mediated
 settlement is unlikely.

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- -- Iran could opt for a more itnense conventional war. This option would be costly, take several years, and force Iran to abandon its policy of independence of foreign suppliers.
 - -- The Soviet Union is the only major arms supplier that could provide enough weapons to have an impact on the war over the next year.
- -- Iraq shows no signs of taking advantage of its materiel superiority on the ground by resuming the offensive, although they recently have been more aggressive on defense.
 - -- We expect them to continue the pressure on Iran with occasional air and missile attacks on border cities and on merchant shipping and oil facilities in the northern Gulf.
 - -- The only way that Iraq can seriously hurt Iran is to systematically attack Khark Island, Iran's primary oil transshipment facility, or international oil tankers. If Iran were to resume 'large-scale attacks' on the border, Iraq might resort to this strategy. International repercussions, particularly from its Gulf allies, will be important deterrents to such a strategy.

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Political Factors

Both Khomeini and Saddam Hussein appear solidly in power for at least the next year.

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- -- The greatest danger to the clerical regime would come from within following Khomeini's death. The clerics are divided over who should succeed Khomeini, and over other important policies.
- -- Saddam Hussein has strengthened his immediate political position since the Iraqi defeats in the spring of 1982 through purges. Iraq's opposition groups--Shias, Kurds, and Communists--can conduct terrorist activity, but do not appear capable of overthrowing Saddam unless Iran scores a major victor.

Economic Factors

The modest improvement in Iran's economic situation is largely attributable to:

- -- The dramatic increase in oil export earnings in 1982 when revenue jumped 64 percent over 1981 to about \$19 billion. We project oil income this year will reach about \$20 billion.
- -- Oil exports are now at 1.6 million barrels per day.

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